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Can the EU Be Democratised? A Political Economy Analysis 
 
ABSTRACT: The decline in confidence in the EU during the euro crisis is verging on a 
legitimation crisis. A political economy analysis of the disparities and contradictions of the EMU 
points strongly towards alternative and more empowered EU-institutions. A problem is that 
establishing them could further deepen the problem of democratic legitimacy, unless we can think 
of ways of democratizing EU practices and institutions in a broader way. Moreover, any plausible 
account of democratization of the EU would have to include a careful analysis of the world 
historical context of transformative political actions. What makes things complicated is that 
political economy analysis of the European integration process reveals also a self-reinforcing 
process, stemming from economic globalization, whereby the ‘wishes’ of business leaders and 
capitalists have become entrenched in the prevailing culture, vested interests and institutional 
arrangements, thus making changes difficult. Moreover, EU-institutions cannot be transformed 
without revising the basic treaties. In the past, treaty-revisions have been piecemeal, cumbersome 
and time-consuming. Real world constraints on transformations include the structural power of 
transnational investors; the influence of the lobbyists in Brussels; and the way media and education 
are being re-arranged across Europe and the world. By way of conclusion, I propose ways of 
alleviating or overcoming these obstacles. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The European Union’s democratic deficit has been talked about for decades.1 The 
metaphor ’democratic deficit’ is, however, a somewhat deceptive basis for thinking 
about the future possibilities of democratising the EU. The term ‘deficit’ refers to a 
quantitative amount that is missing, to a shortage of something, or perhaps to a gap of 
some sort. It brings to mind a dish or container, which is only partially full.  Pour into 
a little bit more, and the deficit is gone. The English word ‘deficit’ is often used, 
moreover, in reference to amounts of money, such as in ‘budget deficit’.  
 
Furthermore, there is an implicit (sometimes explicit) comparison to liberal-
democratic member-states, which may be seen as ‘full containers’. In this discourse, 
                                        
1 While widely accepted as the starting point of discussions, not everyone agrees that there is a democratic deficit in the 
EU. Christopher Lord (2008: 317) singles out three variants of the argument that ‘EU democratic deficit’ is a false 
problem: (1) the Union does not need to be democratic, because it does not and cannot allocate values in any efficient 
way; (2) the Union is already as democratic as it needs  to be, perhaps even more democratic than its member states; or 
(3) a more democratic Union is undesired or undesirable, since it would presuppose a bigger role for European-level 
majorities of voters or representatives  in making decisions binding on all. 
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democracy in the member states is working just fine. The EU container can be filled 
by making the EU institutions more similar to those in the member states, or to some 
idealised version of them. Thus democracy emerges as an institutional model, 
towards which the EU is gradually moving. ‘The Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and 
Lisbon Treaties contributed to improving the democratic legitimacy of the 
institutional system by reinforcing the powers of Parliament with regard to the 
appointment and control of the Commission and successively extending the scope of 
the codecision procedure.’2 The citizens’ right of initiative and dialogue between the 
European institutions and civil society can be also cited as signs of progress. 
 
The point of this paper is not to question the value of strengthening the role of 
European parliament or involving citizens and civil society actors in the EU 
processes. What I want to argue, however, is that a political economy analysis of the 
disparities and contradictions of the EMU points strongly towards alternative and 
more empowered EU-institutions. A problem is that establishing them could further 
deepen the problem of democratic legitimacy, unless we can think of ways of 
democratising EU practices and institutions in a broader way.  
 
What also matters, therefore, is how political possibilities and democracy are 
understood. My second argument is that the analysis of real political possibilities, as 
well as a broader critical-reflexive conception of democracy, evokes sensitivity 
towards relations of power, hegemony and domination, thus providing novel insights 
into the conditions and possibilities of democracy in the EU.  
 
 
Contradictions of the EMU 
 
In 2009-12, many Eurozone countries and, especially the deficit countries, were 
facing an acute public debt crisis. The public debt problem has continued, getting 
worse, but the Outright Monetary Transactions’ Programme (OMT) established by 
the European Central Bank in summer 2012, has succeeded in calming the bond 
markets.  Although the underlying problem lie largely in private debt and in the long-
term process of financialisation (van Treeck, 2009; Rasmus, 2010; Fouskas & 
Dimoulas, 2013: especially ch 2; Patomäki, 2013: especially chs 3 and 4), usually the 
problem has been framed as a problem of excessive public expenditure.  
 
Despite single market and common money, there is no European fiscal policy. By its 
very design, the euro is a foreign currency for all participating countries. Neither the 
supply of money nor the interest rate is under their control. If and when they run 
deficits, the euro countries must turn to world financial markets and to investors who 
                                        
2 As stated in the official website of the European Union, at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/democratic_deficit_en.htm. 
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are indifferent to the fate of people and nations. Investors try to make quick profits 
whenever they can by anticipating short-term developments. Moreover, the longer-
term current account imbalances within the Eurozone have been due to the absence a 
mechanism to balance current account surpluses or deficits. 
 
When the debt to GDP ratios rise especially for deficit countries, a vicious circle can 
easily begin, as it has done time and again during Euro crisis. The demand for default 
swaps rises, contributing to a decline in credit ratings; thereby interest rates rise, 
leading to high interest payments worsening the debt problem into an acute crisis; and 
so on. The subsequent rescue loan packages to the crisis countries have followed the 
standard IMF model, warranting lower interest rates than in private markets, but only 
on the condition of strict measures of austerity and privatisation. Austerity tends to 
contract economies further and thus worsen the debt problem. 
 
At the most general level, the problems of the EMU – many of which apply also to 
the world economy as a whole – can be understood in terms of the relationship 
between parts and whole in capitalist market economy.3 Characteristically, the mutual 
dependency of the parts and whole works out through effective demand and the 
multiplier effect. For (post-)Keynesian economic theories, there is no automatic 
mechanism synchronising diverse temporal processes. Aggregate supply (the total 
productive capacity of the economy) does not usually equal aggregate effective 
demand (total spending capacity). Without mechanisms to ensure a sufficiently high 
level of effective demand for the goods and services produced, these developments 
will result in excess capacity and unemployment. Many developments are self-
reinforcing due to positive feedback loops: lack of demand for goods translates into 
decline in investments, leading to more unemployment and less demand, and so on. 
 
Demand is always monetised, so what matters is whether the interested consumers 
and investors can afford to buy the goods and services. As the propensity to consume 
tends to decrease with higher income, demand depends also on income distribution. 
Due to degrees of monopoly – always part and parcel of developments in capitalist 
market economy – and financial and other more or less fixed temporal commitments, 
prices do not easily decrease so as to match insufficient demand. And if prices do fall, 
a self-reinforcing deflationary spiral becomes rather likely.  
 
Under these circumstances, it is the task of public authorities to ensure full 
employment and stimulate and shape investments and growth. The problem is that the 
                                        
3 For a summary of the key concepts and arguments of (post-)Keynesian economic theory, and why the whole is more 
than the sum of its parts, and how both should be seen in processual terms, see (Patomäki, 2013: ch 2). For more 
detailed introductions, see (King, 2002); and (Lavoie, 2009). At a deeper level, the question is ontological and concerns 
how individual agents and social wholes are related (s ee e.g. Archer, 1995). The context of any given action by an 
individual or collective agent consists of a range of components and aspects of the whole in question; the question of 
the relationship between actions and their context is the agency/structure problem in social theory . 
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more interwoven economic activities are, the more the effects of state policies will 
spread elsewhere. Moreover, particular state-actors see things only from their own 
limited point of view and thus tend to commit the fallacy of composition. The fallacy 
typically arises from the assumption that what is possible for one actor at a given 
moment must be possible for all (or many) of them simultaneously. If the economic 
policies of different states are contradictory, for instance if states simultaneously 
attempt to transfer their economic difficulties abroad by increasing their exports 
relative to imports, the end result can be bad for many countries, or for all.  
 
When we look at things from the standpoint of all actors and countries at once, then 
for instance attempts to increase cost competitiveness through internal devaluation 
prove contradictory. Imagine a simplified world of only two countries. Both try to 
enhance their competitiveness by putting down wage-level or taxes and social 
benefits. As a result, neither country emerges as more cost-competitive than before, 
but both countries face smaller export markets. There will be less efficient demand in 
the system as a whole, thus a weaker basis also for economic growth (or worse, there 
will be a recession or even depression in both countries). The characteristically dire 
social consequences of this kind of policy turn out to be counterproductive from the 
viewpoint of its own publicly expressed rationale, namely growth.  
 
 
Declining support and a rational response to it 
 
Our fates are irrevocably interconnected, but often in a contradictory and 
counterproductive manner. The disparities and contradictions of the world economy 
and especially the EMU have resulted in a long economic downturn. The orthodox 
policy responses have in turn tended to increase unemployment and inequalities, both 
resulting in various social problems. Moreover, attempts to tighten budgetary 
discipline and control (and to a degree also the creation of the banking union), have 
transferred powers to the EU level, without introducing related new mechanisms of 
democratic participation or accountability. These have not left EU’s popularity intact. 
 
The developments of 2010-14 have been associated with a waning of confidence in 
the EU. In spring 2013, it was reported that ‘public confidence in the European Union 
has fallen to historically low levels in the six biggest EU countries’4. The latest 
Eurobarometer from December 2013 tells a similar story. The proportions of 
Europeans who trust the EU has fallen from the peak of 57% in 2007 to 31% in 2013. 
In the first few years of euro this trust stayed consistently at 44-50%; with the euro 
crisis, it began to fall significantly. (European Commission, 2013: 5) 
 
                                        
4 ‘Crisis for Europe as trust hits record low. Poll in European Union’s six biggest countries finds Euroscepticism is 
soaring amid bailouts and spending cuts ’, The Guardian, Wednesday 24 April 2013, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/24/trust-eu-falls-record-low. 
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When exactly does a quantitatively ‘measured’ decline in confidence constitute a 
legitimation crisis? This is difficult to judge. Surveys are contingent on respondents’ 
perceptions of current events, as well as on framing the questions. Representation of 
the ‘public opinion’ is itself a political act, carried out for various ethico-political 
purposes. ‘Public opinion’ as measured by surveys (such as those of the 
Eurobarometer) is not a simple sum total of private opinions, neither is it an ideology 
or general will (Derrida, 1992: 87-88). ‘Public opinion’ tends to be fragmented. Its 
components can also be apathetic or indifferent; or hostile to being surveyed. While 
the reasons for a particular attitude towards an issue may vary, each line of reasoning 
follows an inner, more or less consistent logic of meanings. These meanings matter to 
people and are thus normatively laden and loaded (cf. Sayer, 2011). From the 
standpoint of rational discourse of democratic citizens, the validity of claims 
concerning the EU and its future possibilities can be critically assessed.  
 
To the extent that the economic troubles, rising social problems and new forms of 
budgetary surveillance and discipline have contributed significantly to the de-
legitimation of the EU during the short euro era, as seems to have been the case, 
normative evaluation should focus on the social structures and mechanisms that have 
causally generated these effects and developments. From a normatively oriented point 
of view, the question becomes whether it would be possible to accomplish a 
transformation ‘from unneeded, unwanted and oppressive to needed, wanted and 
empowering sources of determination’ (Bhaskar, 2011: 6). For instance, would it be 
possible to absent the absence of adequate mechanisms to balance current account 
surpluses or deficits in the EU, and perhaps globally? Would it be possible to subject 
the European supply of money and interest rate under political control, to aid fiscal 
policy? What new institutions are required for European fiscal policy, in terms of 
both public revenue and expenditure? Could also monetary policy support the aim of 
full employment? How could the process of financialisation itself be reversed?  
 
These questions suggest a programme of major institutional transformations, 
implying new powers on a European and perhaps also on a global scale. Consider a 
scenario that I have developed elsewhere (Patomäki, 2013: ch 6). The scenario of a 
‘social-democratic EU’ includes European taxes and proper fiscal policy. The EU 
budget is comparable to public expenditure of the biggest member states, i.e. at least 
7-8 times the 2014 budget. Economic policy is based first and foremost on fiscal 
means, seeking full employment and economically and ecologically sustainable 
growth. Monetary policy aims at supporting fiscal policy promoting investments and 
growth. If over-capacity and lack of sufficient demand develops, public budgets and 
thus efficient demand will be increased with central bank funding (this indicates also 
common Eurobonds, partly replacing national debt).  
 
In this scenario, moreover, EU regional policies aim at reversing self-reinforcing 
processes of uneven developments and guaranteeing most even possible regional 
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development level throughout EU. Common income, wage, and industrial policies are 
established and investments have been partially socialised, following the classical 
Keynesian line. The member states are allowed to follow similar economic policies. 
 
In this post-Keynesian EU 2.0, common budget and laws are more significant than 
ever. This re-raises the question of democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions. For 
instance, the Council is a problematic institution from a democratic point of view. 5 
Arguably it should be replaced with something more democratic. This suggests 
applying traditional parliamentary democratic principles6 at the EU level: 
commission, or a new EU government, should be made directly responsible to the 
parliament, parliament (possibly bicameral) deciding on budgets and on laws. 
Parliamentarians and citizens should get the right to put forward legal and budgetary 
motions. This is in line with the basic thrust of the ‘democratic deficit’ discourse.  
 
However, as the European Central Bank (ECB) plays a key role in this scenario, the 
quest to democratise the ECB too emerges.7 For instance, the ECB can be made 
answerable to democratically elected council or to the European parliament, perhaps 
to its second chamber. The federal Senate-principle can be employed, each euro 
country having the same amount of elected representatives (two or three).8  
                                        
5 The Germany-France axis has frequently set the agenda of the Council, but especially since the euro crisis, the 
German government has assumed leadership in steering the development of the Union. This is not justified and cannot 
be acceptable in the long run (for a critique of the current German leadership, see Beck, 2013). Moreover, the Council is 
generally regarded as the least open to the public. It has several problems from a democratic point of view. Ministers of 
the governments lead the negotiations , but their accountability is too indirect to be credible. “Successful” negotiations 
require all too often that citizens do not even know what their government is seeking (or what the agenda is). There are 
also limits to how far individual control could ever add up to collective control. To what extent the control of individual 
governments in the Council can add up to control of the Council? From the point of view of individual voters, votes cast 
in national elections on European issues may be at the opportunity cost of voting for a preferred party on domestic 
issues; and from that of national representatives, the costly acquisition of expertise on EU issues may be time that has 
that has to be diverted from full scrutiny of domestic issues. Moreover, also the EP cannot check and balance the 
Council, as its powers are ill-defined and enmeshed with those of the EU bureaucracy. (Lord, 2008: 318) 
6 Also the role of national parliaments can be strengthened in the EU, in spite of the issue of costly acquisition of EU 
expertise (see note 5). This might be a more reasonable response to Jürgen Habermas’ (2012: 36-7) conception 
according to which every citizen participate in the European opinion- and will-formation processes both as national and 
European citizens than that of preserving the role of the Council. It should also be stressed that according to the 
principle of subsidiarity, supranational decisions should not be made unless necessary. The principle of subsidiarity may 
be applied even against ‘fair competition’ within the common market, thus prioritising values other than ‘free markets’. 
7 The doctrine of central bank independence is based on two fears. The fear of political business cycles is not based on 
solid historical evidence (the case of Nixon in the early 1970s was an exception, not the rule); while the fear of inflation 
is grossly exaggerated and one-sided (it is in the interests of the owners of capital and especially financial capital to aim 
for the lowers possible level of inflation, that is, for the maximum retention of the value of money and debts over time). 
Please note, however, that also a democratised ECB would be in some important ways independent from the 
Commission, Parliament and member states’ governments, as its governing council is elected separately.  
8 This would take a long step in countering the one-sided German leadership in the Union and especially the EMU. The 
Council of ECB could also include representatives of other EU institutions, in particular the Parliament and the 
Commission (or whatever the successor of Commission’s will be called). At any rate, the directly elected 
representatives would have a clear majority in the Council. The federal senate principle would ensure that the central 
bank reflects different regions and interests in a balanced manner and does not set monetary policy, for example, to 
support only a single large surplus country or in view of the short-sighted desires of the biggest member states .  
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Apart from formal institutions, democratic legitimacy stems in important part also 
from well-functioning economic policy, from full employment and social justice, as 
well as from social rights and a sufficient level of guaranteed basic income for all EU 
citizens. These also enable citizens’ equal participation in political processes. 
Furthermore, to make economic developments less prone to crises, the EU plays a 
role in coordinating and otherwise harmonizing income and wage policies. At the 
most general level, the EU takes part in shaping the rate, composition, and direction 
of economic growth through active public investment policies, also to make growth 
ecologically and socially sustainable.  
 
Going beyond conservative versions of social democracy, this scenario may involve 
room also for direct, participatory, and deliberative democracy. Hope for a better 
future –requiring at least some tentative understanding of the next level of the good 
society – could stem from promises to democratise social sub-systems and pluralise 
forms of property. These can be made subject to experiments and learning. 
 
 
On the political possibilities for change 
 
Any plausible account of democratisation of the EU would have to include a careful 
analysis of the world historical context of transformative political actions. This 
analysis must take into account the relevant rules, resources, actor-identities, 
structures and mechanisms. What is the actual and potential political support for a 
reform proposal? What kinds of social forces could be expected to support a change? 
What kinds of circumstances might induce change-oriented activities? What are the 
prevailing structural constraints; and what are the established procedures of decision- 
and law-making? What would be the feedback – and possibly cumulative effects – of 
a reform? Could a particular reform enable, or preclude, other reforms? 
 
EU-institutions cannot be transformed without revising the basic treaties. In the past, 
treaty-revisions have been piecemeal, cumbersome and time-consuming. The Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) took two and a half years to negotiate 
but was never ratified (most member countries adopted it without referenda, but 
French and Dutch voters rejected the document in May and June 2005). The ruling 
parties and coalitions in the member states and in the European Parliament set limits 
as to the possible directions of changes. The newly elected European Parliament for 
2014-19 is neither transformative (the leading EPP group supports status quo; while 
the Eurosceptic groups are against giving any new powers to the EU) nor especially 
legitimate (voter turnout in May 2014 was only 43,9%). In 2014, hardly any member 
state is ruled by a party or coalition that would support a full-scale ‘social-democratic 
model’ of the EU. Some may prefer more economic stimulus under the circumstances 
of 2014-15; but even the left is divided on the big picture. 
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A deeper understanding of the prevailing political forces requires looking more 
closely at the hegemonic ideas and how they are being reproduced. As a systematic 
analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, a few remarks will have to suffice. Michał 
Kalecki (1943) famously argued that the business leaders and capitalists wish to 
create circumstances (i) in which the level of investments and thus employment 
depend on their confidence, which gives them “a powerful indirect control over 
Government policy” (ibid.: 325); (ii) in which the scope of private and profit-oriented 
markets is maximised; and (iii) in which the business leaders and capitalists do not 
cease to have measures to discipline the workers and their demand for equality and 
democracy. These ‘wishes’ are best seen in terms of a transfactual tendency, 
constituted and rationalised by particular notions of efficiency, justice and freedom.9  
 
There can be and also have been – especially during the Bretton Woods era – 
powerful countervailing tendencies, but economic globalisation has once more 
opened up possibilities for this tendency to thrive. Stephen Gill and David Law 
(1989) have developed an account of the structural power of transnational capital to 
clarify why this tendency has become, again, so strong since the 1970s and 1980s. 
Transnational corporations make investment decisions on a regional or global scale, 
thus conditioning states through their expectations of ‘minimal political risks’ and 
good ‘business climate’. Under these circumstances, politicians and voters have 
learnt lessons from the past experiences of state policy. As interests and power tend 
to interfere in communication and learning processes, these lessons are often biased 
and contested. Nonetheless, though ambiguous, the typical lessons drawn from these 
experiences (e.g. Sweden in the mid-1970s, France in the early 1980s) have tended to 
favour the neoliberal right: ‘confidence’, good ‘business climate’ and 
                                        
9 The ethos of a capitalist market economy has always been based on the negative conception of freedom from state (or 
any forceful) interference, and on the scalar distribution model of justice—the more you contribute, the more you get. 
John Locke justified these  with a labour theory of value. Everybody is entitled to their personhood and produ cts of their 
own labour. Private property and its yields may accumulate over time. Contemporary theorists have redefined this in 
terms of supposedly neutral market procedures, claiming that what matters is procedural distribution, and, secondly, 
that playing by the competitive rules of the market ultimately benefits all parties. The standard message of mainstream 
neoclassical economics is similar. The two key notions of neoclassical economics are: (i) Pareto optimal equilibrium 
and (ii) marginal productivity. Pareto-optimality means that no arrangement can improve the position of anyone without  
making worse the position of somebody else. This implies that redistribution is not allowed  to increase overall well-
being or justice. Pareto-optimality is used routinely by the economists  as a normative standard in evaluating different 
possible institutional arrangements . Furthermore, according to the theory of marginal productivity, the contribution  of a 
factor is defined to be the marginal product of that factor. If we make enough assumptions  about rationality, nature of 
transactions, the substitutability of factors, diminishing returns, and so forth, then a mathematical theorem can be 
invoked to show that the sum of the contributions, thus defined, will be exactly the amount produced. If we make 
additional assumptions to ensure ‘perfect competition’, it can be shown that the market price of each factor will be  
equal to its contribution. In a famous, and also contested, interpretation of the ethico -political essence of marginalist 
economics, John B. Clark wrote in 1899: ‘it is the purpose of this work to  show that the distribution of income to 
society is controlled by a natural law, and that this law, if it worked without friction, would give to every agent of 
production the amount of wealth which that agent creates’ (Clark, 1908: 1). Assuming the scalar distribution model 
(‘the more you contribute, the more you get’), this amounts to a theory of justice according to which in competitive  
markets everyone gets what they deserve. (Patomäki, 2006: 107-8; see also O’Neill, 1998, for a systematic and critical 
discussion of the alleged neutrality of markets). 
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‘competitiveness’ have come to be seen as prerequisites of successful economic 
policy. Social democratic and socialist parties in different countries have adapted not 
only to these ambiguous lessons but also to the changes in their potential electoral 
base, which has become increasingly middle-class, individualist and consumerist 
(partly due to the very success of the welfare state). Hence a shift to the right. 
 
The ensuing perspective is individualist also in another sense. The ‘international’ too 
can be understood as consisting of separate state-individuals, the EU being sui 
generis, but for many purposes like a state. Even when state actors’ awareness 
develop and they stop seeing the social context in mere parametric terms (as an 
‘external thing-like environment’), and when they become aware of the strategic 
interactions and game-like situations between individual actors (Elster, 1978: 159), 
they may still reify theirs and others’ interests and options. For instance, governments 
may recognize that economic globalisation is a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, where 
states compete in attracting investors by means of neoliberal reforms, which may be 
seen as less than fully desirable because of their negative effects on democracy, 
social justice and security, well-being, and indeed on economic growth. However, 
because of the reifications of interests and strategic options, the individual state-
actors still do not know how to resolve the contradiction between individual and 
collective rationality – and this reification and incapability may also be a co-result of 
other interests playing a role in the communication and learning processes. 
 
Social processes, also when they originate from contradictory rules, principles and 
effects, are often self-reinforcing. After a critical turning or tipping point, the 
dynamics of self-reinforcing process, characterised by positive feedback to at least 
some actors, tends to support and institutionalise the original choice or choices. Thus 
reversals become increasingly difficult. Dynamics triggered by particular events 
and/or processes at one point in time may reproduce themselves or accelerate even in 
the absence of the recurrence of the original events or processes. (Pierson 2004) The 
mechanisms of learning, power and institutionalisation are particularly important in 
triggering and sustaining a self-reinforcing process. Actors respond to others’ actions 
in a way that seems to give evidence for a generalised world view, or culture, which 
is reproduced also through systems of media and education. A slight change in 
relations of power may also imply more power to change the rules of the game within 
which political contestations take place (for instance, more room is opened up for the 
influence of private money and lobbying in politics). Finally institutionalisation can 
further reinforce a historical process and its direction, by creating new vested 
interests and by binding also political opponents and locking in the current policies. 
 
Even when a particular geo-historical path turns out highly counterproductive, the 
political organisation may be no longer able to learn and change its course. Given 
how the EU has been constructed since the Maastricht Treaty, and given the 
hegemonic situation in European in the global political economy more widely, the 
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Euro crisis has not been deep enough to induce real changes. The EU continues along 
its set path. It is a key characteristic of a rational democratic society that it learns and 
transforms itself easily. However, a non-learning society becomes, with no trouble at 
all, blind, and “is driven, like bullet or torpedo, wholly by its past”, to quote Karl 
Deutsch (1963: 111). This may indeed be the fate of the EU. 
 
 
Meanings of democracy and processes of democratization 
 
At this point it is important to clarify the meaning of democracy. What does it mean 
to say that humans are free, equal and autonomous and that they should themselves 
rule and determine their own future? What should democratic equality and will-
formation mean, especially in a globalizing context? Democracy is best conceived as 
a process of democratisation, within which the very idea of democracy itself is being 
contested, discussed and redefined (see Patomäki and Teivainen, 2004: 1-9). There is 
no model that would exhaust all democratic possibilities; and without any movement 
towards further democratisation, strong tendencies to corruption and accumulation of 
power can easily take over. In other words, within a supposedly stable state of 
democracy, de-democratising tendencies may become self-reinforcing and thereby 
also contribute to reducing political organization’s learning capacity. 
 
John Dryzek (1996: 5 et passim) has argued that there are at least three different 
criteria to identify democratisation:  
 
1) Franchise, i.e. the number of participants in any political setting. 
2) Scope, i.e. the domains of life and social relations under democratic control. 
3) Authenticity, i.e. the degree to which democratic control is substantive rather 
than symbolic, informed rather than ignorant, and competently engaged. 
 
It is important to add also a fourth criterion, concerning the self-delimitation of 
democratic political action:  
 
4) The self-binding of democracy, i.e. a democracy should not be allowed to 
destroy democratic practices and procedures of peaceful disagreement and 
conflict resolution; and a majority should not be allowed to destroy its own 
learning capacities or to deny others’ voice and equal access to the decision-
making positions. 
 
Any system or area of social life can be democratized. The larger the number of 
people allowed on an equal basis to participate in the political process, either directly 
or through their representatives, the more democratic they are. According to the ‘all-
affected’ principle, everyone who is affected by a decision, policy or law has a prima 
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facie right to participate in the process of collective will-formation.10 Plurality of 
voices and wide participation imply a thriving democracy. Authenticity of 
participation is also the key to understanding the learning capacities of the 
community or organization. Not everyone can, of course, participate in all processes 
– hence the need for elected representatives and deliberative forums – but everyone 
can take part in some processes, and all processes should be open to everyone 
concerned either directly or via representatives.  
 
Democracy refers also to specific qualities of the institutional setting within which 
political processes take place. Thus democracy involves principles such as the rule of 
law, principle of publicity, and diverse principles of separation of powers (See Kuper, 
2004, for an insightful discussion on any of these principles). The rule of law and 
principles of publicity are meant to guarantee legal equality and everyone’s free 
access to all relevant information; and the point of power-separations is to minimise 
the risk of self-reinforcing tendencies of de-democratisation. With right 
modifications, these principles can be applied in any context, in the workplace as well 
as in central banks, in national parliaments as well as in multinational corporations.  
 
A well-functioning democracy requires also fair and equal opportunities for free 
education; and guarantees for basic means of living under all circumstances. As the 
use of critical reason is essential for authentic and democratic will formation, public 
universities and research institutes too have a vital role to play in a democracy.  
 
 
What does it take to democratise the EU? 
 
What, then, can be done to democratize the Union?  Political economy as a viewpoint 
draws attention to important mechanisms and processes other than those of formal 
parliamentary democracy. In large measure, democratic legitimacy wells from the 
outcomes of economic policy and from the way political economy institutions are 
organised, especially in terms of their democratic responsiveness and accountability.  
 
What makes things complicated is that political economy analysis of the European 
integration process reveals also a self-reinforcing process, stemming from economic 
globalisation, whereby the ‘wishes’ of business leaders and capitalists have become 
entrenched in the prevailing culture, vested interests and institutional arrangements, 
thus making changes difficult. Unionists, civic actors and political parties have 
                                        
10 Johan Karlsson (2006) is right to say that the all-affected principle generates problems immediately as soon as we try 
to use it to draw political boundaries . Political boundaries cannot be redrawn for each issue at stake. Yet it is often 
possible to include those outside in the process of opinion- and will-formation. Moreover, systematic patterns of 
discrepancy can also be used as an argument for redrawing the inside/outside boundaries and for creating new common 
institutional arrangements. Sofia Näsström (2011) argues that we should first distinguish between the all-subjected 
principle and the all-affected principle; and second allow for different meanings for the all-affected principle, 
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reacted to this hegemony within the Union in diverse and often also contradictory 
ways (see e.g. Erne, 2008, for an analysis of labour organizations’ responses). 
 
What are the complex conditions of institutional changes towards a well-working and 
democratic EU? Real world constraints include the structural power of investors; the 
influence of the lobbyists; and the way education and media are being arranged. Also 
the rights and principles that are constitutive to relevant forms of agency –  e.g. the 
private corporations, or citizens and their associations – shape power-relations. Each 
site of power can be democratised, with implications to the possibilities of changes in 
other sites and contexts. Also democratisation can become self-reinforcing, even if it 
is also true that each positive feedback loop always works only to a point. 
 
The structural power of global investors can be alleviated and, over time, overridden 
by means of collective actions by the states, through fashioning new international law 
and creating new systems of global governance (or government). Aided by support 
from civil society organisations and movements, these collective actions can create 
new worldwide regulations and regimes and generate institutional innovations such 
as global taxes. This is an old idea: overcoming contradictions by collective actions. 
 
The problem is that at least some states, which are constrained by the structural 
power of transnational capital, should be able to develop an autonomous will to 
overcome this power by means of joint actions with other likeminded states, by 
building ‘coalitions of the willing’. The formation of will for changes can best be 
seen as a learning process, characteristically triggered and provoked by a crisis. So 
far the euro crisis has led to small concessions by the EU and some of its member 
states in this direction, most notably with the proposals of financial regulation and the 
transaction tax, but apparently a deeper crisis is required before something genuinely 
new can emerge. The more entrenched the prevailing ideas, the bigger the crisis or 
catastrophe must be for collective learning to take place. 
 
The influence of the lobbyists is the second major constraint for adequate institutional 
changes. The power of lobbyists can be seen in the outcomes of many EU (Cronin, 
2013) and global (Beder, 2006) processes. For instance, it has been argued that “far 
from being a solution to avoid future public bailouts and austerity, Europe’s new 
[2014] banking union rules look like a victory for the financial sector to continue 
business as usual”11. The business as usual includes locking-in the liberalisation of 
the financial markets. This outcome in important part a result of the lobby groups of 
the banks having been part of the process of creating the banking union every step of 
the way (the European Banking Federation has even played a key part in forming the 
proposals of the Commission). This particular but important example exposes a 
                                        
11 Corporate European Observatory (2014). ‘A union for big banks’, available at http://corporateeurope.org/financial-
lobby/2014/01/union-big-banks.  
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general problem, characterising law- and policymaking in the EU. Lobbying in 
Brussels has become a billion-euro industry. The lobbying ‘community’ in Brussels 
consists of from 15,000 up to 30,000 lobbyists, two-thirds of whom are representing 
transnational corporations and banks. Lobbyists in Brussels are claimed to influence 
some 75% of European legislation. Especially the corporate lobbyists follow 
carefully the ‘wishes’ of business leaders and capitalists , and related ideas.12  
 
The EU lobbying practices pose a major obstacle to any democratic change. As John 
Rawls (1973: 226) argues, if political ‘funds need to be solicited from the more 
advantaged social and economic interests, the pleadings of these groups are bound to 
receive excessive attention’. Non-governmental organizations have all too often been 
content to call for improved ethical codes of practice and making lobbying practices 
more transparent. Giving the ideal of citizens’ equality in political processes, the 
main democratic objective must be to keep the practices of lobbying heavily 
restricted or to cut them out entirely (only public consultations of various experts are 
needed, and by official invitation only). For exactly the same reason, also the role of 
private money in national and European elections should be strictly curtailed. The 
most simple and fair principle would be to allow only the same amount of public 
funding for all candidates and prohibit all forms of private funding.  
 
The same holds true for public forums and space. In democratic systems, they must 
be free and open to all. ‘The liberties protected by the principle of participation lose 
much of their value whenever those who have greater private means are permitted to 
use their advantages to control the course of public debate’ (Rawls, 1973: 225). There 
are only rudiments of a European public debate. The public forums are still largely 
nationally based. From a political economy point of view, however, what is 
particularly striking is the commercialisation of media and the way national media 
have been integrated to global media corporations. Working parallel with the upsurge 
of new media technologies and mediatisation of politics, these processes have 
transformed the nature of public space (see Axford and Huggins, 2001; Meyer, 2002).  
 
The rise and concentration of advertisement-based commercial media and the 
weakening of public broadcasting systems worldwide have led to a logic of 
disseminating particular interpretations that may be less direct and more diverse than 
straightforward propaganda, yet bears resemblance to Orwellian newspeak (Herman 
and McChesney, 1997; Szántó, 2007). Truth-seeking investigative journalism, 
coupled with long-term educational intent, is replaced with infotainment in which 
everyone tries to get attention by whatever means, and in which the ‘wishes’ of the 
advertisers and corporate owners play a weighty and, over time, increasing role. 
 
                                        
12 See the ’Power of lobbies’ page of Corporate European Observatory at http://corporateeurope.org/power-lobbies.  
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Commercial media power is largely based on advertising. This suggests that taxing 
advertising at a high rate, the game can be smoothed out and funds diverted towards 
supporting public media. The tax rate on mere image advertising could be set at 
100% and the tax on other forms of advertising at 50%. The tax could be agreed 
within the Union or, more preferably, globally. National authorities would collect the 
tax. A part of the revenues collected in Europe should go to financing a public pan-
European media company, which could operate via the satellites and the Internet, but 
may also be able to develop print outlets as well. Its explicit task would be to further 
democracy and cultivate principles and virtues of good public journalism. 
 
Last but not least, also the privatisation and commercialisation of especially higher 
education and research can be seen as an ancillary obstacle to democratic changes. 
The rise of the corporate university (Patomäki, 2005; Washburn, 2006) assumes 
somewhat different forms in different local and national contexts, but overall the 
developments have been relatively uniform worldwide (Mittelman, forthcoming). 
The thrust of these developments has been to subsume universities and other 
organisations of higher education and research to immediate economic interests, 
especially to commercially viable innovations and employment.  
 
New mechanisms of surveillance and control have been created in the interest of 
making academics and researchers as ‘productive’ as possible, understood through 
the lenses of ‘new public management’ and other theories modelled on corporate 
governance and competitive markets. These theories have been better at 
commodifying intellectual activities and expanding the role of managers and central 
administration than actually spurring innovations or employment. As a result, 
however, academic freedom has been compromised in various ways, most 
characteristically in terms of ‘wishes’ and the currently fashionable ideas of the 
business leaders and capitalists. This in turn has an effect on higher education, 
tending towards producing ‘disciplined minds’, i.e. salaried professionals lacking 
creativity or courage to use critical reason (Schmidt, 2001). 
 
There is no simple measure to reverse these developments or to set universities and 
other relevant organizations to a new path. Given that the privatisation and 
commercialisation of higher education and research have been essentially linked to 
the concept of ‘national competitiveness’, the ideal solution would be a global or at 
least European agreement on the basic framework and principles of free, publicly 
funded and self-governing universities. Realising that the corporate university is in 
fact counterproductive in view of innovations or learning more generally, some 
national authorities may well conclude that they can and should adopt an alternative 
model, premised on classical republican theory of the virtues of public good. The 
alternative system would replace technocratic management by past results with a 
collegial system of free discussion and democratic decision-making, providing 
sufficient facilities for all researchers and teachers (external funding being only an 
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auxiliary possibility). The education of citizens is a key task of universities. A 
successful model is likely to spread rapidly, as has happened in the past.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The democratisation of the EU means more than mere cautious and piecemeal 
expansion of the powers of the European Parliament or those of the citizens in the 
legal sphere. The quantitatively ‘measured’ decline from 2010-14 in confidence in 
the EU is already verging on a legitimation crisis. It seems evident that the economic 
troubles, rising social problems and new forms of budgetary surveillance and 
discipline have contributed significantly to the de-legitimation of the EU during the 
short euro era 
 
I have argued, first, that the euro crisis and related economic problems of the Union 
can be explained by post-Keynesian economic theories, implying the need for  
common fiscal policy, drastically revised central bank mandate and redistributive 
mechanisms in the Union. These kinds of reforms could, however, aggravate the 
legitimation problems of the Union, unless they are accompanied by further 
democratisation of the Union. Proper parliamentary democratic principles would 
make a big difference; but it would also be critically important to democratise the 
ECB. In the post-Keynesian EU 2.0, also economic policies ensuring full 
employment and social justice, as well as new social rights and a sufficient level of 
guaranteed basic income for all EU citizens, should give legitimacy to the Union. 
 
Any plausible account of democratisation of the EU would have to include a careful 
analysis of the world historical context of transformative political actions. This is 
then probably the trickiest part of my argument: what makes things complicated is a 
self-reinforcing process (as revealed by political economy analysis of the European 
integration process), stemming from economic globalisation, whereby the ‘wishes’ of 
business leaders and capitalists have become entrenched in the prevailing culture, 
vested interests and institutional arrangements, thus making changes difficult. 
Moreover, EU-institutions cannot be transformed without revising the basic treaties. 
In the past, treaty-revisions have been piecemeal, cumbersome and time-consuming.  
 
Is it the fate of the EU to be blind and ‘driven, like bullet or torpedo, wholly by its 
past’ until a bitter end of some sort? Aided by the insight that any system or area of 
social life can be democratized, in the final part I focussed on the extrinsic and 
intrinsic conditions of changing the EU towards a post-Keynesian and democratic 
direction. Real world constraints on transformations include the structural power of 
transnational investors; the influence of the lobbyists in Brussels; and the way media 
and education are being re-arranged across Europe and the world. The problem in 
each of these instances is corporate power, which can be countered by various 
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measures: from global and European taxes and regulations to drastically curtailing the 
role of lobbyists and private funds in the process of opinion- and will-formation. 
 
World history proceeds through nodal points. A rupture and breaking point may first 
be reached locally; a successful model is likely to spread rapidly. Any successful 
political strategy by a government or political party would have to combine attempts 
to shape the extrinsic and intrinsic conditions for acting otherwise, by building 
European or worldwide ‘coalitions of the willing’, with various economic and other 
policies that can succeed even under the rather constrained contemporary 
circumstances. It is true, of course, that learning may occur also within the current 
EU institutions, but this is unlikely to happen unless the crisis deepens even more, or 
turns into a full-scale catastrophe.  
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